Twenty-five State Houses of Assembly have reportedly endorsed the proposed constitutional amendment to establish state police, but concerns over political interference, human rights violations, and weak accountability continue to raise questions about how effectively the proposed safeguards would protect Nigerians.
The endorsements mean the proposal has satisfied and surpassed the mandatory constitutional threshold under Section 9(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which requires approval by resolution of the Houses of Assembly of at least two-thirds of all states, equivalent to 24 of Nigeria’s 36 states. With 25 states concurring, the National Assembly must now collate the resolutions, complete the remaining legislative process, and transmit the bill for executive assent before the reform can become law.
In a report published on October 27, 2026, The Guardian examined concerns that state police, while intended to improve security, could expose citizens to abuse if governors and other political actors exert excessive influence over law enforcement.
The states reported to have endorsed the proposal are Adamawa, Ogun, Delta, Plateau, Kwara, Edo, Osun, Oyo, Rivers, Zamfara, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bayelsa, Benue, Cross River, Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe, Imo, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Taraba, Yobe, and Kebbi.
Supporters of decentralised policing argue that Nigeria’s centralized police structure is overstretched and often struggles to respond quickly to security threats in local communities. They say state police could improve intelligence gathering, crime prevention, and emergency response, particularly in areas affected by kidnapping, banditry, and communal violence.
However, placing additional policing powers under state executive control has raised sharp concerns about the potential targeting of political opponents, critics, and vulnerable communities.
To mitigate these risks, the proposed framework includes safeguards intended to limit partisan abuse. These include explicit statutory prohibitions on using police powers for political, ethnic, religious, sectional, or personal purposes, as well as provisions governing the appointment of state police commissioners and the composition of State Police Service Commissions.
Under the proposed oversight arrangements, State Police Service Commissions would include representatives from independent institutions and civil society, such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), the Public Complaints Commission (PCC), retired senior police officers, and the media.
The framework also preserves federal primacy by allowing federal intervention under specified emergency circumstances, including situations where a state police service suffers an operational breakdown or when public disorder exceeds local policing capacity.
Nevertheless, legal safeguards alone do not guarantee enforcement. Critics warn that executive influence over appointments, funding, and operational directives could still undermine oversight bodies, particularly during elections or periods of heightened political tension.
The fundamental issue remains whether these oversight institutions will possess sufficient structural independence, guaranteed funding, and legal authority to investigate complaints, protect victims, and hold offending officers accountable.
Proposals for stronger accountability emphasize independent civilian oversight bodies with direct powers to receive public complaints, conduct unannounced inspections of detention facilities, and initiate disciplinary proceedings. Experts also highlight the need to shield State Police Service Commissions from political removal while establishing uniform national standards for police training, operational conduct, and human rights compliance.
Furthermore, the reform necessitates clear statutory boundaries to govern how federal and state police services will share responsibilities, conduct joint operations, and resolve jurisdictional disputes without compromising citizens’ fundamental rights.
Legislative momentum has built as the Federal Government advances preparations for the accompanying statutory architecture. On October 20, 2026, the Presidency announced that the Presidential Working Group on the National Policing Bill had completed a comprehensive draft bill alongside 29 related amendment bills, submitting them to the Federal Ministry of Justice for final review.
Both the constitutional alteration bill and the secondary implementing legislation must complete their legal procedures before state police services can become operational.
Ultimately, the success of state policing will depend not only on bringing law enforcement closer to local communities but also on ensuring that officers remain accountable to the law rather than political officeholders. Without independent oversight, transparent funding mechanisms, and enforceable sanctions for misconduct, formal legal safeguards will struggle to prevent the abuses they were designed to curb.
