Three coordinated suicide attacks in Maiduguri have killed more than 25 people and injured dozens, marking a worrying escalation in Nigeria’s long-running insurgency. The blasts, which targeted civilian areas, reflect a growing operational alliance between rival factions—Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS)—that have historically been locked in internal conflict. Analysts and security officials now warn that the collaboration is increasing the scale, sophistication, and lethality of attacks across Borno and neighbouring states.
For years, infighting between the two groups weakened their capacity to mount large-scale operations. That dynamic now appears to be shifting. Joint operations have targeted military bases and communities, with senior officers killed and towns such as Ngoshe facing mass killings and abductions. The return of suicide bombings, combined with night-time assaults and improved tactical coordination, suggests the insurgents are rebuilding operational capacity. Violence is also spreading beyond the northeast into parts of north-central Nigeria, extending the conflict’s geographical reach and complicating security responses.
Despite increased military efforts and foreign support, including intelligence and surveillance assistance from the United States, many residents say security conditions are worsening. The attacks in Maiduguri, a city that has endured the brunt of the insurgency for over a decade, underscore the persistent vulnerability of civilian populations. The psychological toll of suicide bombings, coupled with the displacement and economic disruption that accompany prolonged insecurity, continues to weigh heavily on communities already struggling with poverty and limited access to basic services.
The evolving nature of the threat raises urgent questions about strategy. As insurgent groups adapt and coordinate more effectively, the security response must also evolve. Counter-insurgency efforts that focus narrowly on military engagement may be insufficient to address the networked, adaptive tactics now being deployed. Strengthening intelligence gathering, improving community-level engagement, and addressing the underlying governance deficits that enable extremist recruitment are increasingly critical to reversing the current trajectory.
