MTN Group’s $2.2 billion acquisition of IHS Towers marks a fundamental restructuring of Africa’s telecommunications infrastructure model, challenging the independent tower company framework that underpinned the continent’s mobile revolution. By reclaiming strategic control over assets it once sold, Africa’s largest operator is responding to acute macroeconomic pressures—currency volatility, inflation, and rising energy costs—that have made third-party leasing increasingly expensive and unpredictable. For Nigeria, where IHS operates over 15,900 towers and accounts for the vast majority of its tenancies, this transaction carries profound implications for competition, network investment, and the future cost structure of mobile communications.
The deal’s economic logic is rooted in the realities of operating networks in volatile emerging markets. IHS currently derives approximately 70 percent of its revenue from MTN, meaning the operator has been paying a margin to a third party for infrastructure it relies on heavily. By bringing those assets in-house, MTN expects to unlock cost savings, improve its ability to manage foreign exchange exposure, and integrate infrastructure more tightly across the value chain from fibre and spectrum to radio sites and data centres. The company argues this integration will accelerate 5G deployment and allow better coordination between operating companies and infrastructure assets.
The strategic pivot challenges the neutrality assumption that has defined Africa’s tower market for nearly two decades. Independent tower companies built their business on colocation, enabling multiple operators to share passive infrastructure and reduce duplication. The tenancy ratio—the average number of tenants per tower—became the key metric, with IHS targeting approximately 1.58 tenants per tower. In theory, this shared model lowers costs for everyone while accelerating coverage expansion.
MTN’s acquisition fundamentally alters that calculus. According to Segun Cole, CEO of Maasai VC, the transaction signals a broader shift “from a market of independent TowerCos to a market of captive TowerCos.” Even if IHS continues operating as a standalone entity with arm’s-length commercial arrangements, competitors may worry about subtle advantages in rollout schedules, maintenance priorities, and upgrade sequencing. Cole describes the situation as a “nightmare scenario” for tenants such as Airtel, which may soon be renting space from their largest competitor.
The concentration issue is particularly acute in Nigeria, where IHS’s footprint makes the company unavoidable for operators seeking national coverage. Diseye Isoun, CEO of Content Oasis, notes that “you definitely cannot cover Nigeria in terms of having a national network without using IHS towers. So there is no escape.” Smaller tower operators such as Pan African Towers (764 towers) and Africa Mobile Networks (4,000 towers) manage far fewer sites, mostly in niche or rural areas, leaving most mobile network operators heavily dependent on IHS and American Tower Corporation’s 8,270 towers for nationwide coverage.
This market structure means tenants cannot easily switch providers; towers are fixed, location-specific infrastructure where coverage depends on precise site placement, power availability, and backhaul connectivity. Any perceived preferential treatment for MTN in lease amendments or 5G upgrades across thousands of shared sites could materially affect competitors’ network quality and rollout timelines.
The acquisition is already triggering strategic responses. Bharti Airtel increased its stake in Indus Towers to majority control in early February and has established subsidiaries in Nigeria and Zambia, signalling a potential push toward infrastructure autonomy. In Nigeria, Globacom already runs its tower network in-house, with its self-managed portfolio growing to approximately 8,774 towers in 2024, making it the country’s second-largest tower company. If MTN’s integration proves successful, other operators may accelerate similar ownership strategies.
The transaction also reflects changing infrastructure financing dynamics. IHS is being acquired at a valuation of $6.2 billion, significantly below its public market peak of $7 billion in 2021, highlighting the challenges faced by infrastructure companies operating in volatile markets. Cole argues that public markets often undervalue such assets due to macroeconomic noise rather than operational performance. By taking IHS private, MTN can align investment decisions with long-term network plans rather than quarterly earnings expectations.
The economics of tower sharing remain compelling. Research from the Toulouse School of Economics shows that infrastructure sharing can lower both capital and operating expenses by 40 to 60 percent. A study of 107 tower deals across 28 low-income countries found that within two years of major tower-sharing agreements, mobile data prices fell by approximately $1.00 per gigabyte. If the industry moves away from shared tenancy toward operator-owned towers, duplication could rise, increasing capital requirements across the sector.
Yet there is potential upside. Greater infrastructure control may enable operators to differentiate networks and improve service quality. India’s Jio, which owns its core network and transport infrastructure, offers tailored network slices and ultra-low-latency connections impossible on shared infrastructure. For Nigeria’s digital economy ambitions, such capabilities could unlock industrial automation, advanced enterprise services, and enhanced consumer experiences.
Regulatory scrutiny is expected, particularly in Nigeria, where competition concerns will be paramount. The government has stated its intention to review the deal. Isoun believes regulators must assess the impact on competition and pricing, warning that “if they do an independent and neutral assessment, it will become very clear very quickly that this acquisition will lead to more monopoly for MTN.” With data prices and network quality politically sensitive issues, any perception that consolidation could increase costs may attract close policymaker attention.
The long-term impact depends on competitor responses. If rivals continue leasing from IHS, the neutral tower model could survive in modified form. But if operators increasingly build or acquire their own networks, the industry may fragment into competing infrastructure systems—a significant departure from the shared approach that helped drive Africa’s telecom growth. For Nigeria, the outcome will shape network investment, service quality, and the competitive dynamics of a sector central to economic transformation.
